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Abstract
This paper examines the equilibrium eect of a shift in the capital income tax
rate upon state prices, risk-neutral probabilities, and corresponding security
prices in a single-period binomial model economy with an exogenous risk-free
rate. The policy design under consideration consists of a simple linear tax code
that applies the economic rent as a tax base. It is shown that if tax proceeds
are transferred to outsiders, a shift in the tax rate aects state prices, risk-
neutral probabilities as well as equilibrium security prices. Thereby, the eect
for the equilibrium price of a security is sensitive with respect to the correlation
between its own payo and the payo of the market portfolio. If in contrast
tax proceeds are redistributed within the cohort of market participants, risk-
neutral probabilities, and security prices are unaected by a change in the tax
rate, although state prices are sensitive with respect to the tax rate.1. Introduction
In most economies of the world capital income is exposed to taxation on personal level that
simultaneously produces two effects. First, it drives a wedge between two dominant building
blocks of any economy: consumers and ﬁrms.1 Second, it allocates funds in the hand of the
public sector. Arguably, both effects have the potential to signiﬁcantly affect economic activi-
ties within an economy. For instance, they may inﬂuence the cost of capital for ﬁrms by altering
prices of securities with ﬁxed pre-tax payoffs. Such a pricing effect is likely to be expected for
most real economies, since empirical evidence indicates that capital markets in general are not
perfectly integrated.2 Thus, capital income taxes are supposed to have a considerable impact
upon the level and risk-structure of real investments, which in turn determine economic growth
and thus (economic) well-being of subsequent generations of the economy.
Now, while these arguments seem fairly standard in economic theory, there is surprisingly
few theoretical work discussing the effect of capital income taxes upon the level of equilibrium
security prices.3 In particular, the major strand of literature examining economic effects of
capital income taxes, the public economics literature, does not seem to examine the pricing
effect. In fact, the public economics literature seems mainly concerned with the effect of capital
income taxes upon risk-taking behavior of individual agents studying the issue within the small
open economy framework where consumers are faced with exogenous world prices. A second
strand of literature discussing the effect of capital income taxes is the asset pricing literature. In
contrast to public economics, this literature is mainly interested in the effect upon the prevailing
risk-return structure when discussing the effect of capital income taxes. Thereby, the literature
in general examines the issue within the closed economy but does not account for the fact that
taxation allocates funds in the hand of the public sector. Moreover, mostly relying on mean-
variance preferences these studies are not able to examine the effect for the (absolute) level of
security prices.4
Having in mind these shortcomings of the existing literature, this paper aims at extending
1See OECD (1994) for an introduction to capital income tax regimes of many developed countries. Joumard
(2001) and Schratzenstaller (2003) discuss taxation of capital within the European Union.
2For instance, econometric analyses of investment decisions ﬁnd that investor behavior in equity-markets is
characterized by a home bias (e.g. Lewis, 1999) and even a local-bias (e.g. Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; Hong,
Kubik and Stein, 2005).
3Poterba (2002, p. 1161), for instance, concludes his survey with the remark that ”[a] ﬁnal issue that warrants
attention is the effect of taxation on the overall level of asset prices.”
4See for instance the static capital asset pricing models in Brennan (1970) and Litzenberger and Ramaswamy
(1979, 1980), which rely on mean-variance preferences or (multivariate) normal distributed security returns. In
these models the predicted market price of risk is a non-trivial function in agents’ coefﬁcient of global absolute risk
aversion (e.g. Rubinstein, 1973). This, however, makes it impossible to derive analytical results for the effect of
taxation upon equilibrium security prices for reasonable preferences (e.g. CRRA preferences). Similar problems
occur in the dynamic analysis of Auerbach and King (1983).
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of a shift in the capital income tax rate upon state prices, risk-neutral probabilities, and corre-
sponding security prices. More speciﬁcally, we analyze a policy design that consists of a simple
linear tax code in a single-period model economy with an exogenous risk-free interest rate but
endogenous stock prices. With respect to accumulated tax proceeds two polar approaches are
discussed: either the government redistributes them within the cohort of market participants
or transfers them to ’outsiders’ (i.e. non-market participants). The rationale behind our model
set-up is as follows: we are interested in the effect of capital income taxes for an economy with
perfectly integrated bond but locally segmented stock markets.5 Instead of analyzing any par-
ticular country’s tax regime, we consider a rather stylized tax system that applies the economic
rent (deﬁned as the sum of dividends or interests plus capital gains) as the tax base. However,
in the single-period set-up analyzed here our tax regime coincides with a ﬂat withholding tax
on capital income including dividends, interests, and capital gains as currently discussed by the
German government (e.g. Drost and Rezmer, 2006).
We restrict ourselves to a binomial model, which allows us to derive analytical results for
a broad variety of von Neumann/Morgenstern preferences. Thereby, we adopt an after-tax
state-price pricing approach and characterize the price of any security as the after-tax payoff
weighted sum of all corresponding state prices. With this idea in mind, we disentangle the pric-
ing effect under consideration into an equilibrium effect and a payoff effect. Speciﬁcally, the
effect of a particular policy design upon equilibrium state prices is called the equilibrium ef-
fect, since it essentially mirrors the effect upon well-being of the representative stand-in house-
hold. Thus, the equilibrium effect is not only determined by taxation but also by redistribution
of risky tax proceeds. Moreover, recalling that risk-neutral probabilities are normalized state
prices, the equilibrium effect may further be disentangled into an effect for the prevailing risk-
free after-tax interest rate and an effect for corresponding risk-neutral probabilities. In contrast,
the effect upon after-tax payoffs promised by a particular security is called payoff effect.6 The
payoff effect of taxation is straightforward: it is determined by the tax code under considera-
tion. Putting the two effects together gives us the pricing effect. Applying a kind of reversed
adjusted present value approach, we ﬁnd that the pricing effect of a particular security is de-
termined by the variability of the security’s before-tax payoffs, the effect for the risk-neutral
probability measure and the level of the riskfree before-tax interest rate.
In an application, our model then predicts that if tax proceeds are transfered to outsiders,
i.e. market participants receive no redistribution (no-redistribution regime), a shift in the tax
rate affects state prices, risk-neutral probabilities as well as equilibrium prices of risky secu-
5Here, we in particular have EMU-countries in mind, where the European Central Bank seems to control the
interest rate for Euro-investments.
6Throughout, before-tax payoffs of securities are exogenous primitives to our analysis.
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the correlation between its own payoff and the payoff of the market portfolio. Speciﬁcally, the
price sensitivity of a security is positive, if this correlation is positive (and vice versa). In this
case, our model predicts a negative tax rate sensitivity for the expected ex-ante equity premium,
i.e. an increasing tax rate implies an decreasing expected equity premium and vice versa, since
the market portfolio is positively correlated to itself.7 However, if in contrast tax proceeds are
redistributed within the cohort of market participants (full-redistribution regime), risk-neutral
probabilities and security prices are unaffected by a change in the tax rate, although state prices
are sensitive with respect to the tax rate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature. Section
3 presents the general framework in the absence of taxation. The tax system is introduced and
analyzed in section 4. Applications are examined in section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2. Related Literature
Analyzing the effects of taxation has a long history in economic literature. One strand of
literature is concerned with the effects of taxation upon the risk allocation process. Most of
these papers are concerned with the portfolio choice problem of an individual consumer facing
exogenous pre-tax security returns (e.g.Domar and Musgrave, 1944, Mossin, 1968, Stiglitz,
1969, Sandmo, 1989 and Hilgers and Schindler, 2004). Since there is no equilibrium effect of
taxation prevailing in these kind of models, they refer (implicitly) to a model of a small open
economy. Our tendency towards a different model set-up is rationalized by the home bias. And
in fact, our analysis of a semi-closed model economy predicts effects not observed in the small
open economy set-up. Speciﬁcally, while Sandmo (1989) ﬁnds that there is no substitution
effect from assets with low risk to assets with high risk in a small open economy, we ﬁnd
that in our no-redistribution regime the effect of taxation depends upon the correlation of the
security’s before-tax payoff with the market portfolio. Thus, in a world with inelastic supply of
assets we expect for our no-redistribution regime (i) an increasing demand for risky assets and
(ii) a substitution effect towards securities that are highly correlated with the market portfolio.
There are also papers analyzing the effects of taxation in equilibrium models of closed
economies. Mintz (1982), for instance, analyzes a corporate tax code that basically may be
viewed as a personal tax code taxing excess returns. The author shows that neglecting general
equilibrium effects (i.e. effects upon agents’ marginal rate of intertemporal substitution and
therefore upon the risk-free rate and the market price of risk), the tax code under consideration
7In a recent paper McGrattan and Prescot (2005) examine the effect of taxation for the equity premium in a
deterministic growth model.
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(1985) also analyzes a tax code comprising property, corporate, and personal taxes. The author
shows that if (i) there is no tax revenue from risk-free investments and (ii) transfer payments
leave any agents’ wealth position unaffected, then the tax code is neutral in the sense that
investment decisions are unaffected by taxation. Again, the neutral tax code seems to be a tax
code on excess returns. Konrad (1991) drives the analysis one step further: directly analyzing
a personal tax on excess returns the author shows that such a tax rate is neutral even in a
heterogeneous consumer economy allowing for endogenous production and arbitrary, budget-
balancing transfer payments. These papers analyze conditions which ensure that taxation does
not affect equilibrium outcomes. Essentially, all three papers arrive at a kind of excess return
tax. Finally, the analysis of Bulow and Summers (1984) points out that the equilibrium effect
of taxation signiﬁcantly depends upon whether taxation cuts in gains and risk symmetrically or
not.
Our analysis is not concerned with neutrality results per se, but with equilibrium effects of
a particular tax regime: an economic income tax. In this regime excess returns as well as the
risk-freerate aresubject totaxation. However, our analysisshows thatif(i) therisk-free interest
rate before taxes is exogenously ﬁxed and (ii) tax proceeds are redistributed within the cohort
of market participants, which treat redistribution as a perfect substitute for capital income, then
even an economic income tax is neutral with respect to equilibrium outcomes.
3. The Model Without Taxes
Consider the following single-period prototype model of an economy inhabited by m con-
sumers that group into two classes: n ≤ m rational acting insiders, which (are allowed to) par-
ticipate in the domestic capital market and m−n outsiders. At the outset of the period (t = 0),
each insider owns a portfolio of securities offering exogenous time-1 payoffs. At the same
time, a frictionless (domestic) capital market opens, where insiders may trade their securities
free of transaction costs. Thereby, agents are supposed to trade securities in order to maximize
their (expected) utility over (monetary) time-1 income and security payoffs are the only source
of time-1 income for market participants. Following the mainstream approach of economics
of always-clearing markets, an equilibrium for the economy is an n+1-tuple of n after-trade
portfolios (one for each insider) and a vector of security prices such that (i) for each insider
the time-1 payoff of its after-trade portfolio maximizes its utility subject to the corresponding
budget constraints (characterized by its initial portfolio) and (ii) the capital market clears.
8Allowing for non-state contingent transfer payments and shared public goods, Mintz (1982, Lemma 1) pro-
vides – rather strict – conditions ensuring that there are no general equilibrium effects for a particular ﬁrm.
4 German Working Papers in Law and Economics Vol. 2006,  Paper 33
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2006/iss1/art33Thus, equilibrium prices of the economy are essentially determined by aggregate demand
and aggregate supply of all individuals. However, to keep the problem tractable we assume
that there exists a single virtual household such that if this household is endowed with aggre-
gate resources of all market participants, then equilibrium security prices are characterized by
the household’s optimization problem (e.g. Dufﬁe, 1996, chapter 1). In general, this pricing
household, which is characterized by its preferences, is a function in the level and the structure
of initial resource distribution within the economy. We shall assume, however, that the pric-
ing household is independent of the level and structure of initial resources within the cohort
of market participants, i.e. we presume that there exists a representative stand-in household
throughout mirroring economic behavior of insiders (not only in equilibrium). This assump-
tion is in effect satisﬁed if our model economy allows for aggregation of preferences.9
The following assumptions 1 to 4 specify our model in the absence of a tax authority.
Assumption 1 Time-0 is certain, whereas in time-1 one of two states {r,b} realizes. The
(statistical) probability that state s(∈ {r,b}) occurs is denoted φs ∈ (0,1).
Assumption 2 There are K securities traded in a frictionless domestic capital market, which
are all in a net supply of one. In t = 1 these securities offer exogenously given state-dependent
payoffs zk = (zkr,zkb), which consist of dividends and capital components. Furthermore, there
are at least two securities offering linear independent time-1 payoffs. For the payoff of the
market portfolio Ms = ∑kzks we assume 0 < Mr < Mb. Accordingly, we call r the recession
state and b the boom state.
Assumption 3 There is a stand-in household with preferences over (monetary) time-1 income
X that may be represented by U(X) = ∑s∈{r,b}φs×u(Xs), where u is twice-differentiable with
u0 > 0 and u00 < 0.
Let pk denote the equilibrium price of security k, which is characterized by the optimiza-
tion problem of the stand-in household maxXU(X) subject to the following constraints: (i)
0 ≤ ∑
K










where π0 is a normalization parameter and E denotes the expectation operator with respect
to the probability measure φ. Moreover, let πs denote the equilibrium state-s state price, that
9If an economy allows for aggregation of preferences, equilibrium security prices are independent of the
distribution of initial wealth (here represented by initial portfolios) within the economy. For a dynamic economy
Rubinstein (1974) reports sufﬁcient conditions for aggregation of preferences. Brennan and Kraus (1978) prove
them to be necessary.
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of account in time-1 if (and only if) state s occurs. Then it is easy to see, that π0 may be
characterized as the sum of the two state prices, i.e. π0 = πr +πb.10
Next, we shall assume the existence of an risk-free bond promising an exogenous risk-free
interest rate. Essentially, the bond may be interpreted as a security traded in a perfectly inte-
grated world market for risk-free capital. Thereby, the economy under consideration is sup-
posed to be small such that its impact on world prices is negligible. From this perspective, our
model presumes perfectly integrated bond markets, where only risk-free bonds are traded, and
locally segmented equity markets, where (risky and risk-free) local stocks are traded.
Assumption 4 Agents are offered the unlimited possibility to transfer wealth from time-0 to
time-1 by investing in a risk-free zerobond with an exogenous time-0 price p0 and a time-1
payoff z0 = 1.
The exogenous risk-free interest rate earned by bond investments is given by r0 = p−1
0 −1.
Assumption 4 links r0 to the normalization parameter π0 from equation (1). Speciﬁcally, in
equilibrium equation (1) must also hold for the bond and thus z0 = (1,1) implies p0 = π0.
















and equilibrium state prices (ESPs) are given by πs = (1+ r0)−1 ×{u0(Ms)/E[u0(M)]}×
φs, since the corresponding payoffs are given by χr = (1,0) and χb = (0,1). Clearly, with
assumption 1 and 3 ESPs are strictly positive. Thus, qs = {u0(Ms)/E[u0(M)]}×φs deﬁnes
a probability measure Q on the state space {r;b}, such that pk = (1+r0)−1 ×EQ[zk], where
EQ[zk] = ∑sqs ×zks, for every security k. Accordingly, Q is called risk-neutral probability
measure (RNPM).
4. The Model with a Tax Authority
4.1. Basic assumptions
Our analysis is concerned with a rather stylized tax code taxing the economic rent of a portfolio
with an uniform linear tax rate. Thereby, the tax code does not distinguish between domestic
securities and the risk-free bond. In the single-period model set-up our tax code coincides with
a ﬂat withholding tax on capital income including dividends, interests and capital gains.
10Note that we can not conclude πs = φs ×u0(Ms) from equation (1). In fact, the only thing we know is
πs = α×φs×u0(Ms) for some scalar α (e.g. Dufﬁe, 1996, equation (4)).
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expenditures. The aggregate of a tax code and the associated expenditure regime is called
policy design. With respect to the a policy design’s expenditure part we examine two polar
cases in detail: either tax proceeds are immediately redistributed within the cohort of market
participants in form of monetary transfer payments (full-redistribution regime) or the govern-
ment immediately transfers tax proceeds to non-market participants and market participants
receive no redistribution (no-redistribution regime). As is common in the analysis of taxation
we presume that the government has a commitment technology such that once a policy design
is established the government cannot alter it any more (i.e. we neglect the problem of policy
design uncertainty here).
To discuss the effect of taxation, we extend our assumptions 1 – 4 as follows:
Assumption 5 The tax system is a capital income tax system and applies the economic rent of
a portfolio as a tax base. The tax function is assumed to be linear with a tax rate τ>0 identical
for all agents and all securities. In particular, we assume an immediate loss offset in case of a
negative tax base.
Assumption 6 After enacting the tax code, government chooses an expenditure policy offering
lump-sum redistribution in form of monetary transfer payments. The amount of redistribution
offered to the cohort of insiders is denoted by L = (Lr,Lb). Insiders are well aware what type of
redistribution the authority is going to apply. Moreover, they internalize redistribution in their
optimization problem as an additional source of (monetary) income.
Remark 1 (Assumption 5 and 6) With respect to assumption 5 and 6 the following is impor-
tant to note. Basically, our analysis represents a partial equilibrium perspective of the policy
designs under consideration. First, if there is a state with a negative aggregate tax rate, then ag-
gregate tax revenues of the public sector are negative in that state. This might either be ﬁnanced
by negative redistribution, savings in other public activities, or access to public debt (ﬁnanced
by foreign agents). Thereby, negative redistribution essentially represents a per-capital tax.
Finally, assumption 7 ensures that preferences of the stand-in household for (monetary)
time-1 income are independent of the statutory policy design.
Assumption 7 The introduction of a tax authority does not alter beliefs and preferences of the
stand-in household for time-1 income.
Monetary transfer payments allow consumers to purchase additional private consumption
and the stand-in household, which mirrors economic behavior of insiders, internalizes redistri-
bution to market participants. Thus, τ and L are essentially the only relevant policy parameters
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Remark 2 (Assumption 7) Our model assumes that government collects tax payments in
order to solely grant (monetary) transfer payments, which allow to purchase additional private
consumption (assumption 6). In that case, assumption 7 seems quite plausible. However, if tax
revenues shall be utilized for public projects providing public goods, assumption 7 implicitly
presumes that either there are no public goods or, alternatively, if there are public goods, that
insiders’ preferences for public goods and monetary time-1 income are (perfectly) separable.
While the assumptions necessary in the latter case seem quite strict, they are fairly standard in
much of the public economics literature. In particular, all references discussed in the literature
review section (implicitly) rely on variants of assumption 7. With some effort, the approach
adopted here might also be interpreted as allowing for public goods, however for the cost of
quite strict assumptions concerning public production technologies and preferences for public
goods.
Remark 3 (After-tax riskfree interest rate) Given a policy design P that is characterized by
(τ,L) the state-s after-tax payoff of security k is given by zP
ks = zks −τ×(zks − pP
k ), where
pP
k denotes its time-0 price given P. Furthermore, let rP
k = zP
k /pP
k −1 and ηP
k = zk/pP
k −1
denote the security’s after-tax return and its pre-tax equivalent, respectively. Clearly, our tax
code implies rP
k = (1−τ)×ηP
k for all domestic securities. The same holds true for the risk-free
zerobond. Thereby, the pre-tax return of the zerobond is given by ηP
0 = r0, since its price is
exogenous to the model economy, i.e. pP
0 = p0 for all P (assumption 4). This, of course,
implies rP
0 = (1−τ)×r0.




k ), and its tax bill in state
s sums up to τ×BP




k ). Note, that TP
s < 0
(TP
s > 0) indicates that taxation reduces (increases) time-1 income of the stand-in household.
However, there is also redistribution and the net-effect of P, which is deﬁned as the sum of
tax payments T plus redistribution L, determines the overall effect for time-1 income of the
stand-in household. Furthermore, due to assumption 7 it is only the net-effect of P that induces



















The ﬁrst part of the equation elucidates the idea to disentangle the pricing effect of a particular
policy design P, i.e. the shift from pk to pP
k , into two sub-effects:
11Note that none of the insiders is actually trading in the risk-free zerobond. Hence, there are no tax revenues
from from bond investments.
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E: on the other hand there is an equilibrium effect, i.e. the effect that the policy design
affects ESPs (π → πP).















×φs, for all s ∈ {r,b}, (4)
illustrates that the equilibrium effect again may be disentangled into two sub-effects
E.1: an effect for the risk-free after-tax interest rate (r0 → rP
0 ),
E.2: an effect for the stand-in household’s marginal utilities and corresponding risk-neutral
probabilities (q0 → qP
0 ).
Note, that in principle all three effects may occur for any policy design comprising a capital
income tax code. Furthermore, equation (3) and (4) point out that under assumption 6 (and 7),
the effect of a particular policy design is not only determined by the tax code alone but also by
the expenditure component of the policy design (in particular with respect to effect E.2).
4.2. A kind of reversed adjusted present value approach
Subsequently, we call a security with a pre-tax payoff that is positively (negatively) correlated
to the aggregate pre-tax payoff of the market portfolio procyclical (countercyclical). In our
simple binomial model economy, security k is procyclical (countercyclical), if (and only if) its
time-1 pre-tax payoff in the recession state is smaller (larger) that its boom-state equivalent, i.e.
if (and only if) zkb−zkr > 0 (zkb−zkr < 0).12
To gain further insight into the pricing effect, the following lemma examines (i) the value of
tax payments associated to a security traded in the local (equity) market, (ii) the pricing effect
for a non-taxed payoff, and presents (iii) a kind of reversed adjusted present value approach to
determine the market value of a local stock.13 It turns out, that if the policy design affects the
RNPM of the economy the result in all three cases is sensitive with respect to the the variability
12From an asset pricing perspective, a procyclical (countercyclical) security is characterized by a positive
(negative) beta-coefﬁcient. Moreover, as it is well-known, as long as the stand-in household is risk-averse the








is positive for a procyclical security
k. In contrast, for countercyclical securities the expected after-tax excess return is negative, since countercyclical
provide a kind of hedge against income uncertainty.
13Myers (1974) introduced the adjusted present value approach of corporate ﬁnance theory in order to deter-
mine the value of a levered ﬁrm in the presence of tax-exempt interest payments of corporate debt.
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the lemma is found in appendix A
Lemma 1 (Pricing effect for a general policy design) Supposethegovernmentenforcesapol-
icy design P. Then, the following holds:
(L-1.a) The market value of tax payments tP



























(L-1.c) The price of a taxed security k is given by the price of its tax-exempt equivalent minus
the market value of its tax payments, i.e. pP
k = pP(zk)− pP(tP
k ) (reversed adjusted







where on the r.h.s. only the last term depends upon the prevailing policy design.
Essentially, (L-1.a) and (L-1.b) are ceteris paribus analyses of the implications of the payoff
and the equilibrium effect, respectively, upon the pricing effect. It is shown that in both cases
the ceteris paribus effect depends upon
– whether there is an equilibrium effect for the RNPM of the economy, i.e. whether
there is an equilibrium effect E.2,
– the level of the exogenous interest rate before taxes,
– the prevailing tax rate (in particular, since it determines the prevailing after-tax interest
rate rP
0 ), and
– the cyclicality of the corresponding pre-tax payoff.
Speciﬁcally, if there is an equilibrium effect for the RNPM, then both ceteris paribus effects
are (afﬁne) linear functions in the variability of the corresponding before-tax payoffs, where
the latter is measured by the difference between the boom and the recession pre-tax payoff.
14Note, here that TP
s = −∑
K
k=1tks for all s.
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only sensitive with respect to the prevailing tax rate but independent of the equilibrium effect
for the RNPM.
Accordingly, (L-1.c) shows that for a security with a risk-free pre-tax payoff there is no
pricing effect (no matter what policy design is examined). Clearly, this is a direct implication
of (a) the linear tax code, (b) markets that are in equilibrium, i.e. there is no arbitrage and (c)
assumption 4, i.e. the assumption of perfectly integrated bond markets: if the tax code offers
immediate tax loss offset, the risk-free international bond trades for an exogenous price, and the
local equity market does not offer arbitrage opportunities to its participants, then any risk-free
local stock must trade for a price that is independent of the tax rate. However, for securities
promising risky before-tax payoffs there is a pricing effect, as soon as there is an equilibrium
effect for the RNPM (effect E.2). More speciﬁcally, for risky securities the pricing effect of the
policy design under consideration is determined by the level of the exogenous risk-free interest
rate before taxes, the effect of the policy design upon the RNPM of the economy, i.e. effect
E.2, and the variability of the security’s payoffs before taxes. And again, the pricing effect is
an (afﬁne) linear function in the variability of the corresponding pre-tax payoff.
Remark 4 (Tax rate sensitivity of the pricing effect) It is interesting to note, that the level
of the prevailing tax rate affects the pricing effect only indirectly via (qP
b −qb), since all direct
effects cancel out.
Now, what determines the overall pricing effect for a risky security? Suppose there is
an equilibrium effect causing qP
b > qb, meaning that the economy becomes less risk averse
with respect to after-tax payoffs. For procyclical securities this implies that corresponding tax
payments become more valuable but also the the tax-exempt equivalent. Thereby, the second
ceteris paribus effect overrules the ﬁrst one by the factor (1+r0)/(τ×r0). Thus, the overall
pricing effect for a procyclical security, i.e. a security offering higher pre-tax payoffs in the
boom state (compared to the recession state), is positive. Clearly, things are the other way
around for countercyclical securities or if the equilibrium effect is characterized by qP
b < qb.
Remark 5 (Pricing effect for a shift in the RNPM) In case of an equilibrium effect for the
RNPM, i.e. qP
b −qb 6= 0, the lemma predicts a differentiating pricing effect, which will imply
a substitution effect on the household portfolio level. This ﬁnding is in sharp contrast to the
small open economy ﬁnding in Sandmo (1989).
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In this section we examine two polar assumptions concerning the expenditure part of the pol-
icy design in detail: the no-redistribution regime characterized by Lb = Lr = 0 and the full-
redistribution regime characterized by Ls =−TP
s . The corresponding policy designs are labeled
N and F , respectively.
5.1. The no-redistribution regime
The policy design N comprising a no-redistribution regime serves as a starting point. In case
of the no-redistribution regime, the net-effect of the policy design is given by NN
s = TN
s ,
meaning that the associated equilibrium effect is completely determined by the tax code under
consideration.
We start by analyzing the sensitivity of the RNPM with respect to the tax rate τ. In case of








Among others, the tax rate-sensitivity of qN
s depends upon u, E[M] and Mb −Ms. Instead of
assuming that preferences of the stand-in household satisfy certain conditions, our analysis pre-
sumes that the economy under consideration is sufﬁciently volatile in the sense of the following
assumption 8. The subsequent remark points out that assumption 8 is less restrictive then it
seems to be at a ﬁrst glance.
Assumption 8 For all tax rates, the aggregate tax base of the stand-in household is negative
in the recession state. Formally, BN
r ≤ 0 for all τ ∈ [0,1].
Remark 6 (Assumption 8) Assumption8presumesthatintherecessionstateaggregatecapital
losses of the market portfolio are larger than associated dividends. Essentially, assumption 8 is
equivalenttotheassumptionthattheaggregatedtime-1pre-taxpayoffofthemarketportfolioM
is sufﬁciently volatile. Appendix B shows that assumption 8 is equivalent to Mr ≤ qN
b /(qN
b +
r0)×Mb. The latter, for instance, holds if (a) r0 = 0 or (b) Mr ≤ (1+r0/φb)
−1×Mb.
With assumption 8 the numerator of equation (8) is constant or decreases in the recession
state. In case of the boom state, however, it increases. Since the adjustment works for the
two states in the opposite direction, the effect of the numerator dominates the effect in the
denominator and we arrive at the following proposition, which is proved on appendix C.
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icy design with a no-redistribution regime component. Then, the risk-neutral probability for the
recession state decreases in the tax rate, whereas for the boom state it increases in the tax rate.
The intuition of the proposition is the following: taxation reduces the variability of time-1
security income after taxes. Speciﬁcally, since the tax code provides full loss offset volatility
reduces to zero for τ = 1. In other words, time-1 income and corresponding marginal utilities
become deterministic as τ approaches 1. Thus, limτ→1qN
s = φs.
The following corollary reports that the boom state ESP is always decreasing in the tax
rate. In general the effect for the recession state ESP may be ambiguous, however if r0 = 0 the
sensitivity is monotonic.
Corollary 1 (ESPs under no-redistribution) Suppose the government enforces a ﬁxed policy
design with a no-redistribution regime component.
(C-1.a) The ESP for the boom state is increasing in the tax rate.
(C-1.b) If r0 = 0, then the ESP for the recession state decreases in the tax rate.







b . Therewith corollary becomes an immediate application


















and for part (b) note that r0 = 0 implies qN
s = πN
s for all states s. 
The following proposition applies proposition 1 and combines it with the payoff effect in
order to derive the price effect of taxation in case of a no-redistribution regime. In particular, it
points out that (a) the price effect is sensitive with respect to the variability of a security’s time-
1 payoff before taxes and (b) the sign of the price effect is sensitive with respect to correlation
between the security’s pre-tax payoff and the pre-tax payoff of the market portfolio.
Proposition 2 (Pricing effect under no-redistribution) Suppose the government enforces a
ﬁxed policy design with a no-redistribution regime component. Then, the price effect for any
security depends (afﬁne) linearly upon the pre-tax variability of its time-1 pre-tax payoff. In
particular, for any security the following holds true:
(P-2.a) if the correlation of the security’s payoff with the aggregate payoff of the market portfolio
is positive, its equilibrium after-tax price increases in the tax rate,
(P-2.b) if the correlation of the security’s payoff with the aggregate payoff of the market portfolio
is negative, its equilibrium after-tax price decreases in the tax rate, or
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shows that under no-redistribution an increasing tax rate produces an increasing risk-neutral probability for the
recession state, i.e. qN
b −qb > 0 for all N with strictly positive tax rate. Thus, if zkb−zkr is positive (negative or
zero), an increasing tax rate leads to an increasing (decreasing or stable) equilibrium price of security k. 
The market portfolio is basically a procyclical security, since Mb −Mr > 0. Therefore, in
case of the no-redistribution regime, our model predicts a negative sensitivity of the ex-ante
expected equity premium with respect to the tax rate, since today’s price of the market portfolio
is positively correlated to the prevailing tax rate. The latter also implies that the observed
ex-post equity premium is positively correlated to the prevailing tax rate.
Remark 7 We analyze the no-redistribution regime assuming a non-positive tax base in the
recession state (assumption 8). This assumption is necessary to derive results independent of
agents preferences. Our results remain valid without this assumption if we impose restrictions
on agents preferences similar to the ones discussed in Stiglitz (1969). Discussing the full-
redistribution regime in the next section we can omit the assumption of the negative tax base.
Nevertheless, we will obtain preference-free results.
5.2. The full-redistribution regime
In this section we study the effect of an economic income tax code accompanied by a full
redistribution regime. The corresponding policy design F = (τ,L) is characterized by L =
−TF . That is the redistribution exactly offsets the tax payments and thus the net-effect for the
stand-in household sums up to zero for the full-redistribution regime. However, due to our
assumption of an exogenous risk-free interest rate the full-redistribution regime still induces an
equilibrium effect. This is reported in the following corollary.
Corollary 2 (RNPM and ESPs under full-redistribution) Suppose the government enforces a
ﬁxed policy design with a full-redistribution regime component. Then, the following holds:
(C-2.a) the risk-neutral probabilities are independent of the tax rate,
(C-2.b) the state prices are strictly increasing in the tax rate.





b ), which holds for any policy design P, give part (a). Moreover, the risk-free after-tax return rP
0 = (1−τ)×r0
is strictly decreasing in the tax rate. Then, equation (4) also gives part (b). 
With corollary 2 it is easy to prove that our model predicts equilibrium security prices that
are independent of the prevailing tax rate.
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ﬁxed policy design with a full-redistribution regime component. Then, the equilibrium price of
any security traded in the model is independent of the tax rate.
Proof: The proposition is an immediate implication of lemma (L-1.c) and corollary (C-2.a). 
This result is of particular interest. It states that linear taxation of the economic rent accom-
panied by a full-redistribution regime is a neutral policy design for our asset pricing model with
a risk-averse stand-in household, an exogenous risk-free rate and bounded supply of domestic
assets. Thereby, neutral refers to the fact that the equilibrium security prices predicted by our
model are independent of the tax rate.15
Clearly, the assumption of an economic income tax code as well as the assumption an
exogenous risfree interest rate are vitally important for our neutrality result. To see this, note
that in case of a full-redistribution regime, there is no net-effect of the policy design and the
stand-in household anticipates this. Thus, the RNPM is unaffected by the policy design.16
However, only the two assumptions mentioned above ensure that this implies that there is no
effect for equilibrium security prices and one might expect signiﬁcantly different results for
different tax codes or even for an economic income tax code in a pure closed model economy
with endogenous interest rate.
Remark 8 (The analysis of Gordon (1985)) Our results for the no-redistribution regime are
quite similar to the results of the two-period mean-variance analysis in Gordon (1985). How-
ever, in case of a ﬂat tax, the neutrality result of Gordon (1985) requires that the capital income
tax is in effect an excess return tax, which clearly separates the analysis of Gordon from the
analysis above.
6. Conclusion
We aim at extending the public ﬁnance literature for an asset pricing perspective and examine
the effect of a change in the capital income tax rate upon equilibrium state-prices, correspond-
ing risk-neutral probabilities and security prices in a model economy with perfectly integrated
bond markets but locally segmented equity markets. Instead of analyzing any particular coun-
try’s tax regime, we consider a highly stylized tax system that applies the economic rent (de-
15There are also other concepts of ’tax neutrality’ to be found in the literature. For example Samuelson (1964)
analyzes the neutrality of an economic income tax system with respect to heterogeneous investor-speciﬁc tax
rates. He concludes that (given exogenous returns of securities) the economic rent is the only way to deﬁne tax
deductible depreciations that guarantee an optimization decision which is independent of the tax rate. Jensen
(2003, 2004) extends the analysis of Samuelson to the uncertainty case.
16In our single-period model economy this result is independent of (a) the tax code under consideration and
(b) the assumption of an exogenous risk-free interest rate.
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of capital income produces risky tax proceeds and we account for this fact by allowing for
lump-sum redistribution.
Applying the state-price pricing approach allows us to disentangle the effect of taxation in
two sub-effects: the payoff effect and the equilibrium effect. While the payoff effect captures
the wedge between security payoffs and after-tax capital income, the equilibrium effect char-
acterizes the effect of taxation (and corresponding redistribution) upon economic well-being of
the stand-in pricing household. To analyze the pricing effect of taxation, we examine the value
of a security’s tax payments and the pricing effect for a tax-exempt payoff. It turns out, that the
value of tax payments is a simple function in equilibrium price of the security in the presence
of taxation. The pricing effect for a non-taxed payoff, however, is a function in the equilibrium
price of the claim in a non-taxed world and the variability of the payoff before taxes. Moreover,
applying a kind of reversed adjusted present value approach, we ﬁnd that the pricing effect of
a particular security is determined by the variability of the security’s before-tax payoffs, the
effect for the risk-neutral probability measure and the level of the riskfree before-tax interest
rate.
Inourapplications, weexaminetwopolarexpenditureregimesindetail: theno-redistribution
regime and the full-redistribution regime. Our model predicts that for both redistribution
regimes a shift in the tax rate affects equilibrium state prices of the economy. However, only
in case of the no-redistribution regime risk-neutral probabilities are sensitive to the level of the
tax rate. More speciﬁcally, we show that in case of the no-redistribution regime our model pre-
dicts a pricing effect that is an (afﬁne) linear function in the variability of the security’s pre-tax
payoffs and the sign of the pricing effect is sensitive with respect to the sign of the correla-
tion of the security’s payoff with the market portfolio. Moreover, since the market portfolio
is positively correlated to aggregate endowment, our model predicts for the no-redistribution
regime a negative sensitivity of the ex-ante expected equity premium with respect to the tax
rate, i.e. an increasing tax rate implies an decreasing expected equity premium and vice versa.
However, if in contrast tax proceeds are redistributed within the cohort of market participants,
what basically characterizes the full-redistribution regime, the equilibrium effect and the payoff
effect exactly cancel out. Thus, although state prices are sensitive with respect to the tax rate,
equilibrium security prices are not.
Summing up, we note that our applications predicts quite contrary effects of taxation de-
pending on the corresponding redistribution regime. Although, the question which model is
more appropriate remains an empirical one, there seem to be two arguments in favor of the
no-redistribution regime. First, it is not clear at all whether individuals really account for gov-
ernment transfers in their portfolio choice decisions. Second, there is empirical evidence for
16 German Working Papers in Law and Economics Vol. 2006,  Paper 33
http://www.bepress.com/gwp/default/vol2006/iss1/art33limited market participation as pioneered by Mankiw and Zeldes (1991) and it seems fair to
presume that redistribution does not solely go to privileged market participants but speciﬁcally
to relatively poor non-market participants.
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A. Proof of lemma 1
This appendix proofs lemma 1. We start with an observation.
Observation: For any policy design P we have qP
r +qP
b = qr +qb = 1, which implies qP
b −qb = −(qP
r −qr).








Proof of (L-1.a): Recall, that zP
ks = (1−τ)×zks +τ× pP
k . Thus, corresponding tax payments are given by tP
ks =
τ×zks−τ× pP
k . Next, we have to determine pP
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Proof of (L-1.c): First, note that the equilibrium price of security k is given by applying equation (A.1) to equation
(A.2) in order to obtain
pP





On the other hand, simple algebraic rearrangements show that equation (A.3) gives a reversed adjusted present
value of security k, meaning pP
k = pP(zk)− pP(tk). This proofs the rest of the lemma.
B. Discussion of assumption 8
To gain some insight into assumption 8 note that for any policy designP with an economic income tax component
equation (A.2) holds. Hence, the price of the aggregate market portfolio pP













Accordingly, Mr −∑k pP












Clearly, for r0 = 0 assumption 2 implies that condition (B.1) holds for any policy design P. Moreover, for the
special case of a no-redistribution regime qN
s is given by equation (8). With assumption 2 and 3 this immediately
implies qN
b ≤ φs, since (1−τ)×Mb +τpN
M > (1−τ)×Mr +τpN
M and u0 > 0 as well as u00 < 0. Thus, rewriting





×Mb implies that Mr ≤ (1+r0/φb)
−1 ×Mb is also a sufﬁcient
condition for (B.1).
C. Proof of Proposition 1
This appendix proves proposition 1, where the government is supposed to implement a no-redistribution regime.
Therefore, let N1 and N2 denote to policy designs with no-redistribution expenditure component and associated
tax rates that satisfy τ1 < τ2. Then
u0(Mr +TN2
r ) ≤ u0(Mr +TN1
r )
u0(Mb+TN2
b ) > u0(Mb+TN1
b ),
since by assumption 8 we have TN2
r ≥ TN1
r ≥ 0 and TN2
b ≤ TN1
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In particular, this implies
ar ×E[u0(M+TN1)] < E[u0(M+TN2)] < ab×E[u0(M+TN1)]
sincear ≤1,ab >1andφ(r) aswellasφ(b) aregreaterzero(assumption1). Now, notethatar×E[u0(M+TN1)]<

















The latter, however, implies qN2
r ≤ qN1
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